Stability and growth pact (SGP)
a commitment by members of the European Monetary Union to balance their budgets in order to contribute to the stability of the single currency, which supports monetary policy and was adopted in Dublin in 1996. Article 126 TFEU reaffirmed the SGP. For a number of important reasons, a monetary community with a single monetary policy cannot succeed in the long run without precise coordination of the budgetary policies, which, after all, remain a matter of sovereign decision for the member states. – From Germany’s point of view, the SGP was an essential business basis for monetary union. Without it, there would not have been a single currency in 1999. When, on November 25, 2003, the Ecofin Council decided not to open proceedings against Germany and France for deficit overruns, this central political consensus on stability was effectively abrogated. In general, the fact that the Council of Ministers, and not an independent rating body, is responsible for monitoring deficit levels is regarded as the serious design flaw of the pact. – In the summer of 2009, the EU decided to exclude from government debt the special-purpose entities set up to bail out banks during the financial crisis, which was rightly criticized as a “disastrous fault. In general, it is repeatedly suggested that the pact should not be based on shares of public deficits, but on government spending. – For a long time, the European Council, which is solely responsible for this under Article 15 of the EU Treaty, fundamentally opposed any improvement – i.e., tightening – of the SGP. Only at the beginning of 2013 was it possible to agree on a debt brake, to which all EU member states except the UK and the Czechs committed themselves. – See bailouts, central bank, bail-out, blame game, currency swing, age ratio, deficit financing ban, deficit ratio, demographic hardening, Ecofin Council, euro bonds, euro bonds, European Debt Agency, European Monetary Union, Fundamental Error, European Treasury, Early Warning Law, Monetary Policy, Peer Pressure, Budget Deficit, Budget Indicators, Budget Pre-Reconciliation, European, Notice of Default, Lisbon Agenda, Murphy’s Law, Minhas-Gerais Problem, Sustainability, parafiscal, policy bracket, policy default, primary surplus, rule, golden, shadow state, debt club, debt brake, debt ratio, semester, European, sensitivity analysis, fiscal, solidarity, financial, public debt reduction, public debt pressure, Stability and Growth Pact, fundamental error, fiscal framework, fiscal sustainability, transfer union, contractual compliance, competitive status, international, monetary union 2, economic policy, European. – Cf. ECB Monthly Bulletin of February 2003, p. 53; ECB Monthly Bulletin of January 2004, p. 49 ff (with valuable statistics), ECB Monthly Bulletin of April 2004, p. 58 f., Annual Report 2003 of the Deutsche Bundesbank, p. 87, p. 94 ff. (“serious damage” to the Pact); Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank of August 2004, p. 66 (the Pact after the judgment of the European Court of Justice of July 13, 2004); Monthly Report of the ECB of September 2004, p. 72; Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank of January 2005, p. 43 ff. (important opinion on the “reform” of the Pact); Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank of April 2005, pp. 15 ff. and p. 23 ff. (very detailed presentation of reasons), ECB Monthly Report of August 2005, pp. 54 ff. (guidelines of the Ecofin Council), pp. 63 ff. (on the “reform” of the Pact, very detailed presentation and [thoroughly pessimistic] assessment), Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report of August 2005, pp. 70 f. (forecast), Deutsche Bundesbank Annual Report 2005, pp. 73 ff. (skeptical assessment), ECB Monthly Report of February 2006, pp. 79 et seq. (here, fundamental issues regarding the impact of fiscal policy on financial markets), ECB Monthly Report of April 2006, pp. 67 et seq. (in-depth discussion of the relationship between government spending and economic and financial stability), ECB Monthly Report of February 2007, pp. 77 et seq. (threats to the Pact posed by implicit government debt), ECB Monthly Report of March 2007 (interpretation issues), Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report of October 2007, pp. 48 et seq. (considerations on an effective limitation of government debt), ECB Monthly Report of December 2007, p. 87 et seq. (new commitments; concerns about detailed design), Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report of May 2008, p. 22 et seq. (deficit ratio of individual euro area member countries; [pessimistic] assessment; overviews), ECB Monthly Report of October 2008, pp. 59 ff. (ten-year anniversary of the Pact: detailed assessment; many overviews), Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report of December 2008, p. 33 (critical assessment in the ten-year review of monetary union), Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report of May 2009, p. 25 (contingent liabilities would have to be included in government debt), ECB Monthly Report of September 2009, pp. 92 f. (national government rules to accompany the SGP), Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report of November 2009, pp. 65 ff. (deficit procedures for thirteen euro area member states), Deutsche Bundesbank Annual Report 2009, p. 33 (increase in deficits due to stimulus programs), ECB Monthly Report of March 2010, pp. 91 f. (tabular overview of the financial position of all euro area members 2008-2012, projections from 2010), ECB Monthly Report of March 2010, pp. 50 f. (early warning right of the Commission), Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank of May 2010, p. 12 f. (on guarantees in the course of the European Stabilization Mechanism), Monthly Report of the ECB of March 2010, p. 109 ff. (far-reaching, in-depth reflections on the reform of the SGP; many overviews and [p. 130 ff.] clearly formulated conclusions), Annual Report 2010 of the Deutsche Bundesbank, p. 92 ff. (measures to contain sovereign debt), ECB Annual Report 2011, pp. 146 ff. ([too] many bodies are involved in the issues), and the respective ECB Annual Report, chapter “European Issues,” Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank of April 2011, pp. 53 ff. (measures to prevent sovereign debt crises), Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank of May 2011, pp. 22 f. (debt ratio of euro area members since 2009; forecast for the
year 2013), (detailed discussion of the sovereign debt crisis; many overviews; references), Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank of October 2012, pp. 13 ff. (in-depth discussion of the sovereign debt crisis in EMU; overviews; references), Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank of November 2012, pp. 22 ff. (government budget deficits in the euro area as a whole and in problem countries; overviews), Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank of August 2013, pp. 71 et seq. (new decisions on deficit procedures), ECB Monthly Report of September 2013, p. 113 et seq. (results of the strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact; further improvements are needed), Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report of January 2014, p. 41 et seq. (fundamental issues; status and developments in individual EMU countries).
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University Professor Dr. Gerhard Merk, Dipl.rer.pol., Dipl.rer.oec.
Professor Dr. Eckehard Krah, Dipl.rer.pol.
E-mail address: info@ekrah.com
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerhard_Ernst_Merk
https://www.jung-stilling-gesellschaft.de/merk/
https://www.gerhardmerk.de/
Dalam Uni Moneter Eropa, komitmen para anggota untuk menyeimbangkan anggaran mereka untuk berkontribusi pada stabilitas mata uang bersama, yang mendukung kebijakan moneter dan disepakati di Dublin pada tahun 1996. Pasal 126 TFEU menegaskan kembali SGP. Untuk sejumlah alasan penting, komunitas moneter dengan kebijakan moneter tunggal tidak dapat berhasil dalam jangka panjang tanpa koordinasi yang tepat dari kebijakan anggaran, yang tetap menjadi keputusan berdaulat bagi negara-negara anggota. – Dari sudut pandang Jerman, SGP adalah dasar bisnis yang penting untuk serikat moneter. Tanpa itu, tidak akan ada mata uang bersama pada tahun 1999. Ketika pada tanggal 25 November 2003, Dewan Ecofin memutuskan untuk tidak membuka proses terhadap Jerman dan Prancis atas pembengkakan defisit, konsensus politik pusat tentang stabilitas ini praktis dihapuskan. Secara umum, dianggap sebagai cacat desain yang serius dari Pakta bahwa Dewan Menteri dan bukan badan pemeringkat independen yang bertanggung jawab untuk memantau tingkat defisit. – Pada musim panas tahun 2009, UE memutuskan untuk mengecualikan kendaraan tujuan khusus yang dibentuk untuk menalangi bank selama krisis keuangan dari utang nasional, yang dikritik dengan tepat sebagai “kesalahan yang menghancurkan”. Secara umum, berulang kali disarankan agar pakta tersebut tidak didasarkan pada bagian defisit publik, tetapi pada pengeluaran pemerintah. – Untuk waktu yang lama, Dewan Eropa, yang semata-mata bertanggung jawab atas hal ini berdasarkan Pasal 15 TEU, pada dasarnya menolak perbaikan – yaitu pengetatan – SGP. Hanya pada awal tahun 2013 yang memungkinkan untuk menyepakati rem utang, di mana semua negara anggota UE kecuali Inggris dan Ceko berkomitmen. – Lihat bail-out bank sentral, bail-out, permainan menyalahkan, ayunan mata uang, rasio ketergantungan usia, larangan pembiayaan defisit, rasio defisit, pengerasan demografis, Dewan Ecofin, obligasi euro, obligasi euro, Badan Utang Eropa, Uni Moneter Eropa, Kesalahan Mendasar, Perbendaharaan Eropa, Sistem Peringatan Dini, Kebijakan Moneter, Tekanan Rekan, Defisit Anggaran, Indikator Anggaran, Pra-Pemungutan Suara Anggaran, Eropa, Default, Agenda Lisbon, Hukum Murphy, Masalah Minhas-Gerais, Keberlanjutan, parafiskal, braket kebijakan, kebijakan default, surplus primer, aturan, emas, negara bayangan, klub utang, rem utang, rasio utang, semester, Eropa, analisis sensitivitas, fiskal, solidaritas, keuangan, pengurangan utang publik, tekanan utang publik, Pakta Stabilitas dan Pertumbuhan, kesalahan mendasar, kerangka kerja fiskal, kesinambungan fiskal, serikat transfer, kepatuhan kontraktual, status kompetitif, internasional, serikat moneter 2, kebijakan ekonomi, Eropa. – Cf. Buletin Bulanan ECB bulan Februari 2003, hal. 53; Buletin Bulanan ECB bulan Januari 2004, hal. 49 dst. (dengan statistik yang berharga), Buletin Bulanan ECB bulan April 2004, hal. 58 dst., Laporan Tahunan 2003 Deutsche Bundesbank, hal. 87, hal. 94 dst. (“kerusakan serius” pada Pakta), Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank bulan Agustus 2004, hal. 66 (Pakta setelah keputusan Pengadilan Eropa tanggal 13 Juli 2004), Laporan Bulanan ECB bulan September 2004, hal. 72, Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank bulan Januari 2005, hal. 43 dst. (pendapat ahli yang penting mengenai “reformasi” Pakta), Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank bulan April 2005, hal. 15 dst. dan hlm. 23 dst. (presentasi alasan yang sangat rinci), Laporan Bulanan ECB bulan Agustus 2005, hlm. 54 dst. (pedoman Dewan Ecofin), hlm. 63 dst. (mengenai “reformasi” Pakta tersebut, presentasi yang sangat rinci dan penilaian [sepanjang pesimis]), Laporan Bulanan ECB bulan Agustus 2005, hlm. 70 dst. (perkiraan), Laporan Tahunan Deutsche Bundesbank 2005, hlm. 73 dst. (penilaian skeptis), Laporan Bulanan ECB bulan Februari 2006, hlm. 79 dst. (di sini informasi dasar tentang efek kebijakan fiskal pada pasar keuangan), Laporan Bulanan ECB April 2006, hal. 67 dst. (diskusi rinci tentang hubungan antara pengeluaran pemerintah, stabilitas ekonomi dan keuangan), Laporan Bulanan ECB Februari 2007, hal. 77 dst. (membahayakan Pakta melalui utang pemerintah implisit), Laporan Bulanan ECB Maret 2007 (pertanyaan tentang interpretasi), Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank Oktober 2007, hal. 48 dst. (pertimbangan tentang pembatasan efektif utang pemerintah), Laporan Bulanan ECB Desember 2007, hal. 87 dst. (komitmen baru; kekhawatiran tentang rancangan rinci), Laporan Bulanan ECB Mei 2008, hal. 22 dst. (rasio defisit masing-masing negara anggota di kawasan euro; penilaian [pesimis]; ikhtisar), Laporan Bulanan ECB Oktober 2008, hal. 59 dst. (sepuluh tahun keberadaan Pakta: penilaian rinci; banyak tinjauan umum), Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank bulan Desember 2008, hlm. 33 (penilaian kritis dalam tinjauan sepuluh tahun serikat moneter), Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank bulan Mei 2009, hlm. 25 (kewajiban kontinjensi harus dimasukkan ke dalam utang pemerintah), Laporan Bulanan ECB bulan September 2009, hlm. 92 f. (aturan pemerintah nasional untuk menyertai SGP), Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank bulan November 2009, hal. 65 ff. (prosedur defisit untuk tiga belas negara anggota kawasan euro), Laporan Tahunan 2009 Deutsche Bundesbank, hal. 33 (peningkatan defisit karena program stimulus ekonomi), Laporan Bulanan ECB bulan Maret 2010, hal. 91 f. (ikhtisar tabular situasi keuangan semua anggota kawasan euro tahun 2008-2012, proyeksi dari 2010), Laporan Bulanan ECB bulan Maret 2010, hal. 50 dst. (hak peringatan dini Komisi), Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank bulan Mei 2010, hlm. 12 dst. (mengenai jaminan dalam rangka Mekanisme Stabilisasi Eropa), Laporan Bulanan ECB bulan Maret 2010, hlm. 109 dst. (pertimbangan yang luas dan mendalam mengenai reformasi SGP; banyak ikhtisar dan [hlm. 130 dst.] kesimpulan yang dirumuskan dengan jelas), Laporan Tahunan 2010 Deutsche Bundesbank, hlm. 92 dst. (langkah-langkah untuk menahan utang negara), Laporan Tahunan 2011 ECB, hal. 146 dst. ([terlalu] banyak badan yang terlibat dalam masalah ini) serta Laporan Tahunan ECB masing-masing, bab “Masalah Eropa”, Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank bulan April 2011, hal. 53 dst. (langkah-langkah untuk mencegah krisis utang negara), Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank bulan Mei 2011, hal. 22 dst. (rasio utang anggota kawasan euro sejak tahun 2009; perkiraan untuk (diskusi rinci tentang krisis utang negara; banyak ikhtisar; referensi), Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank bulan Oktober 2012, hal. 13 dst. (diskusi mendalam tentang krisis utang negara di EMU; ikhtisar; referensi), Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank bulan November 2012, hal. 22 dst. (defisit anggaran pemerintah di kawasan euro secara keseluruhan dan di negara-negara bermasalah; ikhtisar), Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank bulan Agustus 2013, hal. 71 dst. (defisit anggaran pemerintah di kawasan euro secara keseluruhan dan di negara-negara bermasalah; ikhtisar), Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank bulan Agustus 2013, hal. 71 dst. (defisit anggaran pemerintah di kawasan euro secara keseluruhan dan di negara-negara bermasalah; ikhtisar), Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank bulan Agustus 2013, hal. 71 dst.), Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank bulan Agustus 2013, hal. 71 dst. 71 dst. (keputusan baru tentang prosedur defisit), Laporan Bulanan ECB September 2013, hlm. 113 dst. (hasil penguatan Pakta Stabilitas dan Pertumbuhan; perbaikan lebih lanjut diperlukan), Laporan Bulanan Deutsche Bundesbank Januari 2014, hlm. 41 dst. (prinsip-prinsip dasar; status dan perkembangan di masing-masing negara EMU).
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Profesor Universitas Dr. Gerhard Merk, Dipl.rer.pol., Dipl.rer.oec.
Profesor Dr. Eckehard Krah, Dipl.rer.pol.
Alamat email: info@jung-stilling-gesellschaft.de
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerhard_Ernst_Merk
https://www.jung-stilling-gesellschaft.de/merk/
https://www.gerhardmerk.de/
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