Problem of representation

With regard to the ECB, the fact that Germany provides twenty-seven percent of the capital subscribed to the central bank, but has the same voting weight as, for example, Malta, which has paid in only 0.4 percent. – As long as the Governing Council is concerned with the common monetary policy in the euro area, the onemember-one-vote principle should be appropriate. However, if the ECB buys government bonds from members such as Greece, Italy or Spain by majority vote in the Governing Council, this rule can and must no longer apply. After all, Germany bears 27 percent of the risk of such transactions and Malta only 0.4 percent. This circumstance inevitably tempts a moral hazard game. Knowing that ultimately Germany is Europayer, the Southern Front will exploit the ECB to finance government finances in their respective home countries. – See Becket effect, democracy deficit, one-vote principle, ECB minutes, publication, ECB Council, European Monetary Union, fundamental error, ECB sin, cash cow, willingness to act, hegemon, mild, savior, rotation principle, seating arrangement dispute, Southern Front, transfer, veiled.

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University Professor Dr. Gerhard Merk, Dipl.rer.pol., Dipl.rer.oec.
Professor Dr. Eckehard Krah, Dipl.rer.pol.
E-mail address: info@ekrah.com
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerhard_Ernst_Merk
https://www.jung-stilling-gesellschaft.de/merk/
https://www.gerhardmerk.de/